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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Supreme Court Docket No. 4&79~-2013 
Ada County No. 2012-19714 
ON APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO 
The Honorable Judge Moody Presiding 
Ray M. Nichols, 
Appellant 
vs: 
State of Idaho , 
Respondent 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief, 
and in that Petition, the Appellant raised several issues, anyone 
of which would have entitled him to relief. 
The District Court appointed Counsel to represent the 
Appellant during the Post Conviction Process. 
The District Court ordered Counsel to prepare and to file 
a Responsive pleading during the Post Conviction Process, but 
appointed Counsel refused to do so. 
The District Court dismissed the Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief, finding that it was not timely filed, even 
though the Petition established claims of ineffective assistance 
of Counsel, and claimed that the District Court lacked subject 
matter Jurisdiction to have imposed the sentence that it did. 
The Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal, and 
appointed the Office of the State Appellate Defender to represent 
the Appellant during the Appeal process. 
The Office of the State Appellate Defender moved to be 
allowed to withdraw as the attorney of record, the Idaho State 
Supreme Court allowed such Motidn2tb withdraw, and the Appellant 
does now submit this Brief in a Pro-Se format. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A). Did the District Court Err When It Dismissed The 
Petition For Post Conviction Relief? 
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ARGUMENT OF FACTS AND LAW 
In the Petition for Post Conviction Relief, the Petitioner 
alleged that he was sentenced illegally, and that an illegal 
sentence could be corrected at any time. 
The District Court disagreed with this holding and entered 
an Order dismissing this claim, and dismissing the Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief. 
The Sentence Imposed Is Illegal And Due Process 
Of Law Demands That It Be Corrected. 
First, a challenge to a Court's subject matter Jurisdiction 
maybe raised at any time during the course of the proceedings, 
even for the first time on Appeal, and may not be waived by the 
parties. State V. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 374, 195 P.3d 731, 
733, (2008); State V. McCarthy; 133 Idaho 119, 122, 982 P.2d 954, 
957, (1999). 
Any order entered without subject matter jurisdiction is 
oid. Troupis V. Summer, 148 Idaho 77, 79, 218 P.3d 1138, 1140, 
(2009); Andre V. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455, 459, 680 P.2d 1355, 1359, 
(1984). 
The Appellant was convicted of the offense of Robbery, a 
iolation of the Idaho Code, Title 18, Section 6501-6503. 
The Punishment for the crime of Robbery is contained within the 
Idaho Code, §18-6503, where it is stated: 
§18-6503. Punishment for Robbery. 
Robbery is punishable by imprisonment in the State 
Prison for not less than five, (5), years, and the 
punishment may extend to life. 
It is based upon this clear language that the~minimun term 
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1 for the crime of Robbery is five, (5) years, and it is d~p±cted: 
2 for in the statute its elf. 
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At the time of the imposition of the sentence, the Court 
ntered an Order which sentenced the Appellant to a term of 
"Fixed" life. This is also called a "Determinate" life sentence, 
r "life without the possibility of parole". 
The Appellant does not argue that the Court could not have 
imposed a sentence of "Life" for the crime of Robbery. The entire 
argument is based upon the belief that the Court did not have the 
Jurisdiction to have "fixed" the Life sentence. 
The ability to "fix" or to make "Determinate" any part 
12 of a sentence is contained within the Unified Sentencing Act, 
13 which is codified at §19-2513. 
14 Under the Unified Sentencing Act, the Determinate portion 
15 of a criminal sentence is considered to be the minimum term, 
16 during which the criminal defendant is not eligible for parole 
17 
1 8 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
r any type of sentence reduction for "Good-time". 
However, not all criminal Statutes are able to have the 
minimum or determinate terms entered by the Court. Some criminal 
Statutes carry within them a pre-set minimum term. Robbery is 
one of those criminal Statutes. 
When a Court is sentencing a criminal defendant under the 
Unified sentencing act.for a crime that carries a pre-set 
minimum term in the statute itself, the sentencing Court must 
use the second paragraph of the Unified Sentencing Act, which: 
is located at §19-2513. 
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§19-2513. Unified Sentence, (Second Paragraph) States: 
If the offense carries a. mandatory minimum penalty 
as provided by Statute, the Court SHALL specify a 
minimum period of confinement consistent with such 
Statute ••••• 
This paragraph of the Unified Sentencing Act uses the 
ord SHALL to command a Court in what it must do. In this case a 
ourt shall specify a minimum period of confinement consistent 
ith such Statute. 
The Statute in question is Robbery, and it carries within 
Statute a five, (5) year minimum period of confinement. 
Because the Statute carries within it a minimum period of 
onfinement, the Court must specify a minimum period, (or fixed 
erm), which is consistent with the minimum period of confinement 
pecified in the Statute. In this case it is five, (5), years. 
So, when the Court ordered the Appellant to be sentenced 
to a term of life, and then ordered that the entire term of life 
be made fixed or determinate, the Court violated the Unified 
Sentencing Act's second paragraph. 
Not all criminal Statutes in the State of Idaho carry a 
minimum term within theistatutes themselves. For instance, the 
crime of Aggravated Battery is punishable by a term of 
imprisonment of fifteen (15), years. There is no mention of a 
minimum period of confinement mentioned in the statute, and for 
this reason it is the first paragraph of the Unified Sentencing 
Act that a Court must use when imposing a sentence fof~the drime 
of Aggravated Battery, and the Court can fix any or all of the 
term. 
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3 confinement, the Unified Sentencing Act mandates that the set 
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the minimum term as set by the statute. Please see, §19-2513, 
second paragraph. 
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, the Eleventh 
Edition, explains the term Consistent as follows: 
Consistent: Free from variation; Tending to be true and 
close to the meaning of an item; Showing 
steady conformity. 
However, that is not really important because we all know 
what consistent means. In this case consistent means that the 
Court at the time the sentence was pronounced should have entere 
a fixed term that was in some way consistent to the five, (5), 
year minimum term as was set by statute. It is clear and it is 
not even remotely disputable that a term of fixed life is not 
consistent with a five, (5) year term. 
In the State of Idaho, when a criminal Statute carrie§ 
within the Statute a minimum term, then, under the Unified 
Sentencing Act, Paragraph 2, the Court SHALL orde~ the Fixed 
term to be consistent with the minimum term as stated in the 
Statute. This leaves the Court the complete discretion to order 
a maximum term as the court feels to be just and fair for that 
particular case, but this shall be ordered as the indeterminate 
term, and not "Fixed". 
Opening Brief of Appellant-5 
1 In light of these plain facts, it is absolutely clear that 
2 when the Court imposed a sentence of. "Fixed Life", (Life without 
3 the possibility of Parole), upon the Petitioner, the court lacked 
4 the ability to' impose such a sentence. The Court Lacked Subject 
s matter Jurisdiction. 
6 The Court of Appeals of the State of Idaho, in the case of 
7 State V. Peterson, 148.Idaho 610, 226 P.3d 552, (2010), Staed as 
8 fo,llows: 
9 " ••• Subject matter jurisdiction can be raised 
by any party at any time, and can not be waived" 
10 
11 This was also the Holding of the Idaho state supreme court 
12 in the case of State v. Lute, 252 P.3d 1255, (2011), where the 
13 Court held as follows: 
14 " •• Judgments and Orders made without subject 
matter jurisdiction are void, and are subject to 
15 collateral attack •••.•• subject matter jurisdiction 
can never be waived or consented to, and a Court 
16 has a sua sponte duty to ensure that it has subjec 
matter jurisdiction". 
17 
18 This above holding was cited in Lute, Supra, based upon 
19 the holding of State v. Urrabazo, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248-1249, (1996. 
20 The subject matter jurisdiction to impose any particular 
21 sentence in a criminal case, is contained within the statute it's 
22 self. The crime for which the Petitioner stands convicted of, 
23 Robbery, is punishable by a sentence of five years, (5), to an 
24 indeterminate life. No where in the Statute does it speak in 
25 terms of a "Fixed Life'' term being able to be imposed. 
Opemi.:n:g Brief of Appellant-6 
1 ''Legislative intent must first be determined from the plain 
2 meaning of the words used, and, if the plain meaning is direct 
3 and certain, and it is unambiguous, the Statute speaks for 
4 itself". Crist V. Segna, 622 P.2d 1028, (1981). 
s "It is well established that a Court must give meaning and 
6 effect to all Statutory provisions". Montana Contractors Assn. 
7 V. Department of Highways, 715 P.2d 1056, (1986). 
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The intent of the Legislature when it passed the Unified 
Sentencing Act is clear and unambiguous. The Statute speaks for 
itself. In the second paragraph of the Unified Sentencing Act, 
it is stated, 
§19-2513, (Second Paragrapµ) 
If the offense carries a mandatory minimum 
penalty as provided by Statute, the Court shall 
specify_a minimum period of confinement 
consistent with such statute. 
The only thing this Court need to look to is whether or 
not the Appellant is convicted of an offense which Statute 
carries a minimum period of confinement within that Statute, and 
if the Appellant has been given a minimum period of confinement 
which is not consistent with that Statute then his sentence is 
illegal and is subject to correction at any time. 
The Appellant is convicted of the offense of Robbery, in 
the Statute for the punishment of the crime of Robbery, there is 
a minimum penalty provided for in that Statute. It is a five,(S), 
year period. 
Because the Appellant was given a minimum period of 
confinement of "Fixed Life", his sentence is illegal, as it is 
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as is provided for in the second paragraph of the Unified 
Sentencing Act for such crimes that carry a minimum period in 
the statute. 
Because the Court did not follow the statutory commands 
as depicted for b¥ the Legislature of the State of Idaho, the 
Court has denied to the Appellant Due Process of Law under the 
United states Constitution, Amendment Fourteen~ 
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"The failure of a State to follow it's own statutory 
commands may implicate a liberty interest protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause". Fetterly V. Paskett, 
997 F.2d 1295, (9th Cir. 1993); Ballard v. Estelle, 937 F.2d 
453, (9th Cir. 1991); Lambright V. Stewart, 167 F.3d 477, (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
Paraprased, "a State's failure to follow it's own laws, 
violates the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause" Hicks V. 
Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 65 l.Ed.2d 175, (1979). 
In this case, the State of Idaho failed to follow the 
clear and mandatory language of the Unified Sentencing Act, at 
the second paragraph, and when it failed to follow those madates, 
it denied to the Appellant Due Process of Law by imposing a 
sentence that is not authorized by law, and is illegal. 
The District Court, when it dismissed the Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief, also erred and denied to the Appellant 
the ability to correct this issue. 
Furthermore, the Appellant raised a valid claim of 
pening Brief of Appellant-a 
1 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, in that Counsel should have 
2 known the difference between a sentence of Life, and a sentence 
3 of Life Without Parole, or a "Fixed Life" term. 
4 A valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be 
5 used as a ;;gateway" to over-come a procedure bar to having such 
6 claims heard by a reviewing court. P~ease see, Martinez v. Ryan, 
7 132 s.ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272, (2012), Thompson v. Coleman, 
8 501 U.S. 722, 111 s.ct. 2546,. 115 L.Ed. 2d 640, ( }. 
9 And, finally, it was the Court who imposed the Sentence upon 
10 the Petitioner who has violated Due Process of Law when the Court 
11 first, at the arraignment, and at the initial appearance, who 
12 informed the Petitioner that the maximum possible sentence that 
13 he was facing, was a term of life; and then this same Court, who 
14 at the time of the imposition of the sentence, stated, " ••• I'll 
15 go one better, .(when the state sought a sentence ot 20 to life), 
16 then imposed a sentence of :'determiante life", which is a term of 
17 "Fixed Life" or life without the possibility of Parole. 
18 This action in and of it self violates the fundamental 
19 principles of Due Process of Law, and fundamental fairness upon 
20 which our country was founded, and violates the Sixth Amendment 
21 to the United states Constitution. 
22 The order of this court, which stated that this case would be 
23 dismissed within 20 days, if the Petitioner did not show cause 
24 as to why it should not be dismissed, seems to over-look the fact 
25 that there is no time limitations in which to challenge the 
Opening Brief of Appellant-9 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Court. 
The District Court, appointed Counsel to assist the 
Appellant in the Post Conviction Petition. The Court also ordered 
that Counsel to file an Amended Petition, and to respond to the 
Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss. 
That Counsel, Randall Barnum, refused to comply with the 
Order of the Court, and instead rendered ineffective assistance 
of Counsel when he refused to litigate to the District Court 
the issues raised in the Petition for Post Conviction Relief, 
such as ·are listed herein: 
a). 
b). 
C) • 
d). 
e). 
That the Sentencing Court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to impose a fixed life sentence 
for the crime of robbery; 
Trial Counsel was ineffective for not properly 
investigating this case prior to Trial; 
Trial Counsel was ineffective for not 
challenging the photo-line up of suspects, 
when I was the only individual shown to 
the witnesses; 
Trial Counsel was ineffective for not p~rsuing 
any form of plea bargain with the State; 
Denial of Due Process of Law when the Court, 
at my Arraignment, informed me that I faced a 
sentence of LIFE. Not a sentence of Fixed Life, 
which is clearly more than a Life sentence. 
I asked Mr. Barnum, who was appointed to represent me in 
the Post Conviction case, about these claims, and he informed me 
that, " ••• claims of ineffective assistance of counsel can not be 
filed outside of any timelimitations, and that the case of 
artinez v. Ran, 132 s.ct.1309, (2012), did not make an 
exception to the holding of Thompson v. Coleman, 501 U.S~-722, 
( ), no matter what I had read. I also raised these claims: 
pening Brief of Appellant-10 
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f). I believe that my Trial counsel was ineffective to 
not informing me that I faced a FIXED LIFE term, 
and not just an indeterminate life term. 
g). ·r believe that I ·was denied my right to the 
effective assistance of counsel during the direct 
appeal process, because' appellate c"ounsel did not 
speak to me regarding the issues or mistakes made 
during trial, or what issues I wanted to raise in 
the direct appeal. 
h). I believe that Appellate Counsel was ineffective 
for not raising on direct appeal, a claim of trial 
counsel being ineffective. 
i). I believe that Appellate counsel was ineffective 
for not seeking a Petition for Rehearing in the 
Idaho state Supreme court. 
j). I believe that Appellate Counsel was ineffective 
for not informing the Petitioner of the fact that 
a decision had been reached by the Idaho· State 
Court of Appeals, which would have started.the 
time limit for filing a Petition For Post Cbnviction 
Relief, and or a Federal Petition For a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus. 
k). I believe that counsel was ineffective for not 
filing a Motion for a sentence reduction under 
Idaho Criminal Court Rule 35. 
1). I believe that Counsel was ineffective-for not 
making a challenge on appeal, to the length of my 
sentence. 
m). I have been denied Due Process of taw because I 
·was never given a copy of the discovery material 
in my case, which prevented me from making a 
decision as to going to trail, trying to make~ 
plea agreement; furthermore, the action of not 
giving me a copy of my discovery material has also 
prevented me from researching issues to be raised 
on appeal. 
Mr. Barnum did not believe that there was any type of 
to these claims norwould he argue them for me. The 
25 fcouit· made it clear that she expected a claim to b~ raised 
23 
24- :merit• 
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against Mr. Barnum for being Ineffective in this case because 
he had not filed any type of documents to assist the Appellant. 
The Appellant also now raises two additional claims as 
follows: 
aa). That Post Conviction Counsel, Randall Barnum, 
Was Ineffective for not performing ANY Court 
ordered responses, nor investigating this case; 
bb). That the Appellant was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel when the Office of the 
State Appellate Defender refused to litigate 
this case on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Pending before this Court is a sister case under number 
40830, which raises the exact same issue as presented to the 
Court in this case. 
The Appellant believes that it was error for this Court 
to not consolidate the cases together into one appeal as the 
Office of the State Appellate defender does not have a competent 
argument on appeal, and the Appellant pro-se certainly does. 
The Office of the State Attorney General has now made a 
concession that the cases of Martinez V. Ryan, 132 s.ct. 1309, 
(2012); and Trevino V. Thaler, 133 s.ct. 1911, (2013), apply to 
the State of Idaho. 
Based upon these two cases, there is an exception to the 
procedural time bar for claims of ineffective assistance of , 
Counsel, and it was error for the district court, and for Mr. 
Barnum not to have recognized this exception and litigated the 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to the Court. 
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It is clear that the sentence which was pronounced upon 
the Appellant is not provided for by Statute. Just as clear, the 
crime of Robbery is one of the crimes which carries within itsel 
a minimum term.iThese crimes are the ones which are specifically 
named in the second paragraph of §19-2513. 
Because the State of Idaho did not following the mandatory 
language of §19-2513, 9Second Paragraph), when it sentenced the 
Appellant, the sentence imposed is illegal and must, as a matter 
of law and justice, be corrected. 
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that this Court 
enter an Order which directs the District Court to re-sentence 
the Appellant in conformity to the Unified Sentencing Act, which 
is codified at §19-2513. (Second Paragraph). 
OATH OF APPELLANT 
Cornes now, Ray M. Nichols, the Appellant herein, who does 
Declare, under the United States Code, Title 28, Section 1746, 
that the enclosed Brief is true and correct to the best of his 
knowledge and belief. 
ant Pro-Se 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Comes now, Ray M. Nichols, the Appellant herein, who does 
certify that he served a true and correct copy of the enclosed 
Opening Brief of Appellant upon the parties entitled to such 
service by depositing a copy of the said same in the United States 
Mail, first class postage pre-paid and addressed as follows: 
Clerk of the Court 
Idaho State Supreme Court 
Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 
83720-0010 
Office of the Att. Gen. 
Att: L.LaMont Anderson 
Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 
83720-0101 
1-Jt::I// 
Dated 
